The first article says, in effect, that no one in the know thinks the troop "surge" Bush called for in January is meeting the benchmarks set for it by him and added to by Congress as a condition for paying for it. Though the final report on its success or failure will not be due until September, an interim report due next week will admit only minor progress has been made.
Meanwhile, the optimistic claim that sectarian killings in Iraq were in fact down in June, after a particularly bloody May, is offset by the second article, documenting at least 170 Iraqi deaths in one 18-hour period. The article says 8 U.S. troops died in the same period of less than a day.
In another article, Special Report: Congress's War Over the War, the Post describes the difficulties four U.S. House members and senators, from both sides of the aisle, are having deciding on an appropriate course of action in Iraq. One of them, Rep. Johnny Isakson, a conservative Republican from Georgia loyal to the president, says the most persuasive argument he hears from the war's opponents is, "There needs to be an endgame."
"I agree fully," oldstyleliberal would like to tell Congressman Isakson. "There needs to be an endgame, and the president doesn't have one. That's why Congress has to take the bit in its teeth and impose one."
It seems like all the experts are saying the same thing: the window within which the U.S. will hold much sway at all in Iraq is shutting rapidly, no matter what Washington does. By early next spring, the pressure of ongoing troop rotations will force us to reduce our military footprint in Iraq, willy-nilly.
Many pundits have been calling for some form of "soft partition" in Iraq, with semi-autonomous Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd sectors. The Post coverage seems to indicate that kind of thing may be evolving in de facto fashion, anyway.
The Post's informants don't think Iran or any other regional power will absolutely control any of these sectors. Still, they will exert influence that is presently unwelcome in Washington.
This is true in part because Iraq's government and political system are now deadlocked, paralyzed. It might be different if U.S. and Iraqi forces were able to dampen the sectarian violence, country-wide ... but they're not strong enough to do so. What would make them get strong enough? Well, if the Iraqi government got more resolute, then just maybe ... but, alas, the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is weak and corrupt. The Iraqi army and security forces, with their sectarian allegiances, are accordingly as much a part of the problem as they are a part of the solution.
In other words, each component of the two-prong solution the president hopes for is blocked by ... the other component. An increase in governmental staunchness is blocked by how ineffectual the Iraqi armed forces currently are, but any improvement there is forestalled by the weakness of the government. It's crazy to expect such a government to command the loyal devotion of its army, no?
Meanwhile, the time window is closing. The hourglass is running out of sand.
Here's the current bottom line, according to the Post coverage:
For its part, the [U.S.] military has calculated that a veto-proof congressional majority is unlikely to demand a full, immediate withdrawal. But however long the troops remain, and in whatever number, [a] military intelligence official said [under condition of anonymity], they see a clear mission ahead. "We're going to get it as stable as we can, with the troops we have, and in the time available. And then, we'll back out as carefully as we can," the official said.
The problem there, as oldstyleliberal sees it, is that the "we" spoken of by the military intelligence official includes only the military. It doesn't include the State Department or the diplomats. It doesn't include Washington, really.
That's a recipe for disaster. If the war in Iraq to date has proven anything, it's that nothing good happens unless U.S. military and civilian decision-makers are on the same page, acting in concert, with a common strategy and set of goals. That happened, albeit to a grudging, limited extent, earlier this year when Congress joined with President Bush to sanction the "surge" — and there was, as a result, less sectarian violence in June.
Now Congress has to step up to the plate again. It has to impose, by a veto-proof majority, an endgame that will salvage as much as possible in Iraq before we have to "back out," as the military intelligence official put it. By "as much as possible" is meant just this: some vestige of stability and order in Iraq, some ability for the Iraqi people, with the assistance of their admittedly less-than-disinterested neighbors in the region, to avert a bloodbath when we leave. No more, or less, than that.
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